Integration and isolation in the global petrochemical industry : a multiscalar corporate network analysis by Verbeek, Thomas & Mah, Alice
  
 
 
 
warwick.ac.uk/lib-publications 
 
 
 
 
 
Manuscript version: Published Version 
The version presented in WRAP is the published version (Version of Record). 
 
Persistent WRAP URL: 
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/141359   
 
How to cite: 
The repository item page linked to above, will contain details on accessing citation guidance 
from the publisher. 
 
Copyright and reuse: 
The Warwick Research Archive Portal (WRAP) makes this work of researchers of the 
University of Warwick available open access under the following conditions. 
 
This article is made available under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-
NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0) and may be reused according to the 
conditions of the license.  For more details see: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-
nc-nd/4.0/. 
 
 
 
Publisher’s statement: 
Please refer to the repository item page, publisher’s statement section, for further 
information. 
 
For more information, please contact the WRAP Team at: wrap@warwick.ac.uk 
 
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=recg20
Economic Geography
ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/recg20
Integration and Isolation in the Global
Petrochemical Industry: A Multiscalar Corporate
Network Analysis
Thomas Verbeek & Alice Mah
To cite this article: Thomas Verbeek & Alice Mah (2020): Integration and Isolation in the Global
Petrochemical Industry: A Multiscalar Corporate Network Analysis, Economic Geography, DOI:
10.1080/00130095.2020.1794809
To link to this article:  https://doi.org/10.1080/00130095.2020.1794809
© 2020 The Author(s). Published by Informa
UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis
Group.
Published online: 28 Aug 2020.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 511
View related articles 
View Crossmark data
Integration and Isolation in the Global 
Petrochemical Industry: A Multiscalar 
Corporate Network Analysis
Thomas Verbeek
Department of Sociology 
University of Warwick 
Coventry CV4 7AL  
UK  
and  
Department of Urban 
Studies and Planning 
University of Sheffield 
Sheffield S10 2TN  
UK  
T.Verbeek@sheffield.ac.uk 
Alice Mah
Department of Sociology 
University of Warwick 
Coventry CV4 7AL  
UK  
A.A.Mah@warwick.ac.uk 
Key words:  
petrochemical industry 
corporate power 
social network analysis 
multinational corporations 
global capitalism
ab
st
ra
ct
The global petrochemical industry has long been 
characterized by stable patterns of Western corpo-
rate and geographic leadership, but since the early 
2000s, the global playing field has changed signifi-
cantly. China has overtaken the US and Europe as 
the world’s largest petrochemical producer, and 
other emerging economies have become global pet-
rochemical players. Combining insights from schol-
arship on global corporate elites, world city 
networks, and relational economic geography, this 
article examines patterns in the corporate networks 
of leading petrochemical corporations. The research 
is based on a multiscalar corporate network analysis, 
applying social network analysis to identify board 
interlocks, joint venture interlocks, and spatial inter-
locks between corporations. Through analyzing cor-
porate networks across multiple scales, the research 
reveals patterns of both integration and isolation 
within the petrochemical industry. Isolation is evi-
dent in disconnected regional corporate elite net-
works, where the established North Atlantic 
corporate elite is interconnected through board inter-
locks, while corporate networks in Asia and other 
emerging economies remain disconnected. However, 
high levels of integration within the industry are also 
evident in an interconnected international company 
system formed through joint venture collaborations 
and in overlapping subsidiary networks centered on 
petrochemical hubs around the world. The article 
argues that the results demonstrate a combination 
of resilience and change, or path dependence and 
contingency, in patterns of corporate power and 
collaboration. Western company networks still 
form the social and spatial backbone of the industry, 
but these have been challenged by emerging strate-
gic centers and isolated elite networks in other parts 
of the world. This article contributes to debates on 
industrial corporate elites, multiple globalizations, 
and the multipolar global economy.
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Throughout the twentieth century, the global pet-
rochemical industry was dominated by a handful of 
Western oil and chemical corporations, with strong 
barriers to entry, concentrating production in 
Western Europe and North America (Galambos, 
Hikino, and Zamagni 2007; Chandler 2009; 
Reubold, Milmo, and Todd 2016). However, since 
the 2000s the regional balance of production has 
been changing. China has rapidly emerged as the 
largest petrochemical producer in the world, over-
taking the US and Europe in the decade of 2006–16 
(European Chemical Industry Council [CEFIC] 
2017). Does the recent surge of petrochemical pro-
duction in China and other emerging economies 
challenge the long-standing resilient configuration 
dominated by Western multinationals?
Corporate elite networks, particularly board interlock 
ties, have been widely researched within the global 
economy and are associated with the exercise of 
power, consensus-building, and market control 
(Fennema and Heemskerk 2018; Sapinski and Carroll 
2018). Building on this, Buch-Hansen and Henriksen 
(2019) consider within-industry board interlocks as 
a less binding form of market control in the European 
chemical industry throughout the twentieth century, sup-
plementing episodes of more binding forms like cartels 
and corporate mergers. Regional corporate elite clusters 
play an important role in the global political economy, 
with long-standing connections between Europe and 
North America, and competing corporate elites in 
emerging economies (Heemskerk and Takes 2016). 
Despite increasing evidence of a multipolar global econ-
omy, research has shown that corporate elites in China 
and Asia have overall remained relatively isolated from 
incumbent Western corporate elites (de Graaff 2012; 
Heemskerk and Takes 2016). In this article, we take 
a broader view on corporate interlocking and present 
a multiscalar corporate network analysis of the global 
petrochemical industry, drawing on methods of social 
network analysis to examine three spaces for corporate 
interaction: corporate boards, joint ventures, and co- 
location of subsidiaries. We pose two research ques-
tions: (1) To what extent are the current corporate net-
works within the global petrochemical industry 
integrated or isolated? (2) What do these corporate net-
works tell us about patterns of power and collaboration?
To address these questions, we have developed an 
analytical approach drawing on methodologies of 
network analysis applied in the global corporate 
elites and world city networks literature. Although 
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both literatures are largely separate, we suggest they can be meaningfully integrated 
based on a relational economic geography perspective. This subfield of economic 
geography rapidly grew since the late 1980s based on an interest in analyzing the 
effects of globalization and global interdependencies on regional-economic develop-
ment and innovation, applying a relational, multiscalar, microlevel economic agency 
perspective (Grabher 2006; Glückler 2007; Murphy 2018). While several theorists have 
warned that the centrality of intentional human agency must be the focal point 
(Grabher 2006; Glückler 2007; Sunley 2008), we believe that, particularly at the global 
level, networks still provide a useful analytical perspective for understanding power 
configurations. Networks are both structural and relational, “being continually shaped 
and reshaped by the action of actors who are in turn constrained by the structural 
positions in which they find themselves” (Nohria 1992, 7). They form an infrastructure 
through which agency and power can be exercised by individual agents, but as a whole, 
they also constitute structural power relations in which inequalities and exclusions 
exist, so-called emergent network relationships (Dicken et al. 2001).
We examine corporate networks of the global petrochemical industry, using a judgment 
sample1 of the top ten petrochemical corporations and four additional corporations from 
emerging economies, based on corporate data collected between December 2017 and 
July 2018. According to industry analyst Eramo (2018), the year 2018 represented “the 
sixth year of an extended upcycle in global chemical markets—characterized by robust 
demand, tight supply, and strong profitability.” Thus, our data capture the end of a cyclical 
period of expansion and growth across all competitive regions of the globe before the 
subsequent downturn due to overcapacity in 2019. Our aim is to investigate patterns of 
integration and isolation within this industry, which has undergone considerable structural 
transformation in recent decades. We build on recent insights and methodological develop-
ments in the global corporate elite network and world city network literatures. From the first 
field, we incorporate ideas on the resilience of the Atlantic ruling class (van der Pijl 1984; 
Heemskerk, Fennema, and Carroll 2016), the isolation of Asian and emerging economies’ 
corporate elites (Carroll 2009), the role of policy-planning institutes as integrative nodes for 
corporate elites to exert influence in political domains (Carroll and Sapinski 2010), and the 
opening up of social corporate network research toward other forms of interlocks such as joint 
ventures (de Graaff 2011). From world city network analysis, we borrow ideas on multiple 
globalizations (Sigler and Martinus 2016), gateway cities (Scholvin, Breul, and Diez 2019) 
and the importance of tax havens and offshore financial centers (THOFCs) in company 
networks (Sigler et al. 2020).
Our analysis shows important differences between corporations from the North 
Atlantic petrochemical heartland, those from Asian advanced economies, and those 
from emerging economies; but our analysis also shows differences within these groups, 
including interconnected versus closed elite networks, the convergence of interests in 
joint venture companies, integrated subsidiary networks, and the significance of partic-
ular cities as powerful hubs for the flows of capital. We interpret the findings of our 
multiscalar corporate network analysis through the concepts of contextuality, path 
dependence, and contingency (Bathelt and Glückler 2003) in relation to regional 
changes in power identified through industry data collection and within existing 
business histories of the development of the petrochemical industry (Galambos, 
Hikino, and Zamagni 2007; Chandler 2009; Reubold, Milmo, and Todd 2016). Our 
1 A judgment or expert sample is a type of random sample that is selected based on the opinion of an 
expert and thus subject to some degree of bias. We chose this method of sampling due to the vast size 
and complexity of the industry, and we outline our methodology in detail later in the article.
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findings also relate to wider debates about competing corporate elites and places within 
an increasingly multipolar global political economy (Amin 2013; Heemskerk and 
Takes 2016). In the next section, we present a brief overview of the history of the 
petrochemical industry, followed by our analytical approach combining methodologies 
for studying global elite networks and world city networks. Subsequently, the data and 
methods will be outlined and described, followed by a description of the results and a 
final discussion section.
The Global Petrochemical Industry
The petrochemical industry specializes in the production and trade of petrochem-
icals, which are derived from oil and natural gas, forming the basis of thousands of 
everyday products including plastics and other polymers. Petrochemicals account for 
90 percent of total feedstock demand in chemical production today (International 
Energy Agency [IEA] 2018), and therefore the terms petrochemical and chemical 
industry are often combined or used interchangeably. The petrochemical industry is 
situated between the upstream oil and gas industry and the downstream plastics 
industry. The main petrochemical players include different kinds of companies: verti-
cally integrated multinational oil companies, multinational chemical companies, verti-
cally integrated national oil companies, and specialty chemical companies. As the IEA 
(2018, 11) argues, the “diversity and complexity of this sector means that petrochem-
icals receive less attention than other sectors, despite their rising importance … [as] the 
fastest growing source of oil consumption.” We aim to redress the balance, focusing 
our attention on the complex networks of this industry.
The modern petrochemical industry emerged during the Second Industrial 
Revolution of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, alongside other capital- 
intensive industries such as primary metals, electrical machinery, and automobiles 
(Galambos, Hikino, and Zamagni 2007). The first petrochemical plants were built by 
major oil companies and were usually located close to refineries, since the main 
intention was to find uses for the by-products of oil refining to increase profit margins 
(Mitchell 2009; Clews 2016). Initially German, Swiss, and British producers dominat-
ed the world markets, but during the First World War the US became an important new 
player, boosted by its abundance of nonrenewable natural resources and the sheer size 
of its internal market (Chandler 2009).
The Second World War and the postwar economic recovery brought the petrochemi-
cal sector into an era of large-scale technology-driven production and commercializa-
tion, closely linked with scientific research, starting in the US and soon afterward 
Western Europe and the new petrochemical power Japan (Chandler 2009; Reubold, 
Milmo, and Todd 2016). By the 1960s, the petrochemical industry had emerged as an 
industry of its own, dominated by five postwar leaders: the US, Germany, France, the 
UK, and Japan. In this period, states intervened extensively, with industrial policies 
promoting large-scale chemical producers (Buch-Hansen and Henriksen 2019).
In the 1970s and 1980s, two politically induced oil shocks led to radical uncertainty, 
increased costs of production, a slowdown of the growth rate of consumption, and 
a downsizing and reorganization of the petrochemical industry (Galambos, Hikino, and 
Zamagni 2007). While the initial response to the oil crisis was the formation of (illegal) 
cartels, particularly in Europe, these were terminated by regulatory developments 
promoting liberalization (Buch-Hansen and Henriksen 2019). Together with the en-
trance of new Asian challengers from Taiwan, Saudi Arabia, and South Korea, this led 
to intensified global competition. Further globalization throughout the 1990s and 2000s 
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promoted foreign direct investment by major petrochemical companies, while domestic 
petrochemical producers from emerging economies also started to invest heavily, 
aiming at self-sufficiency. These evolutions contributed to a large restructuring process 
of mergers and acquisitions, and further geographic agglomeration of production 
among major Western companies (Reubold, Milmo, and Todd 2016).
However, until the end of the twentieth century, production and corporate leadership 
remained concentrated in the US, Western Europe, and Japan (Clews 2016). Despite 
globalization, the petrochemical industry had been remarkably stable, especially when 
compared with other knowledge-based, high-technology industries (Chandler 2009). 
The major enterprises still included some of the traditional leaders that had secured 
their market dominating positions well before the Second World War (e.g., BASF) or in 
the postwar petrochemical revolution (e.g., Mitsubishi Chemical), joined by the petro-
chemical divisions of established oil companies (e.g., ExxonMobil). Galambos, Hikino, 
and Zamagni (2007) argue that the traditional leading firms had for the most part 
successfully transformed themselves from producers of upstream, basic-chemical com-
modities into leaders in the manufacturing of downstream, fine, and specialty chemical 
products. The firms had also sought access to resources and national markets and 
economies of global scale, and in so doing, had preserved their dominant position.
This traditional geographic configuration has been disrupted over the past two 
decades, with a dramatic increase of production in areas with competitively priced 
feedstock, particularly in Asia. This has led to structural changes, with site closures in 
the more established and mature European markets (Clews 2016). China, the most 
important new player, has overtaken the US and Europe as the largest petrochemical 
producer, and other emerging economies are expanding petrochemical production 
rapidly. While the EU, NAFTA,2 and Japan still held a combined share of 59.5 percent 
in world chemicals sales in 2006, this share plummeted to only 35 percent in 2016 
(CEFIC 2017). In the same decade, China grew to be the largest petrochemical 
producer, with its share tripling from 13.2 to 39.6 percent. The only two other regions 
whose share increased were India (from 2.0 to 2.3 percent) and what the CEFIC calls 
the Rest of Asia3 (from 10.3 to 12.1 percent). These numbers show that petrochemical 
production has been undeniably moving away from its traditional heartlands, but as our 
analysis shows, this does not mean that patterns of corporate leadership are also 
shifting at the same pace. These changes have also led to a more diverse petrochemical 
playing field, with different combinations of upstream and downstream businesses, and 
varying global and regional ambitions.
Global Corporate Networks
In this study we bring together two strands of literature that explore issues of 
hierarchy and networking in the structures of global economic power: (1) the global 
corporate elite network literature focuses on relations between firms, formed by their 
directors; and (2) the world city network literature focuses on relations between cities, 
formed by firms and subsidiaries located in these cities. While the roots of both 
literatures go further back in time, empirical studies started to emerge from the 
1980s onward, based on a theorization of two phenomena in the globalizing capitalist 
economy: the emergence of a transnational capitalist class (Sklair 2001; Robinson 
2004) and of global cities (Friedmann 1986; Sassen 1991). Sklair (2001) and Robinson 
2 North American Free Trade Agreement, a free trade bloc consisting of the US, Canada, and Mexico.
3 Asia minus China, India, Japan, and South Korea.
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(2004) theorize that national identities of corporate elites would be replaced by 
a common transnational identity with a shared sense of economic interests and an 
enhanced capacity for unified political action, forming a transnational capitalist class 
“tied to globalized circuits of production, marketing and finances unbound from 
particular national territories and identities and with interests in global over local or 
national accumulation” (Robinson 2004, 47). At the same time, Friedmann (1986) and 
Sassen (1991) observe the emergence of global cities or world cities, being the basing 
points in the spatial organization of global production and markets, with highly 
concentrated command and control functions. Both literatures started to explore the 
existence of these phenomena from the 1980s onward, mainly based on all-industry 
samples of the world’s biggest firms. Partly in response to criticisms, they gradually 
expanded their scope, sought integration with other theories, and evolved toward more 
regionalized, sectoral, and qualitative approaches. While a lot of progress has been 
made and some authors have tried to integrate both research fields, we contend that 
there are still interesting opportunities missed of combining both approaches. In the 
remainder of this section we give a brief overview of both literatures and outline why 
we want to combine their approaches.
Global Elite Networks—Social Corporate Interlocking
A particularly popular application of social network analysis has focused on the 
corporate boards of multinational corporations, and the connections that directors in 
these boards have with other corporations through interlocking directorates (“when 
a person affiliated with one organization sits on the board of directors of another 
organization” [Mizruchi 1996, 271]). It is the combination of such corporate interlocks 
that underpins Domhoff’s (1967) prediction of a corporate community or, at the 
transnational level, Sklair’s (2001) idea of a transnational capitalist class.
The concept of a transnational capitalist class was first theorized at the end of the 
twentieth century, but computer-assisted empirical research on the transnational net-
work of interlocking directorships had already taken off in the 1970s and 1980s 
(Fennema and Heemskerk 2018). Fennema’s (1982) groundbreaking study on inter-
locks among the largest firms in North America, Europe, and Japan showed that the 
globalization of capitalism did not go hand in hand with the expected internationaliza-
tion of corporate elite social structures. There were signs of a sparse integrated 
transatlantic network, but it connected resilient national clusters. Later studies pointed 
to significant progress in transnational elite formation (particularly in Europe), a further 
consolidation of the transatlantic connection, and a more horizontal structure of 
corporate interlocking with a larger number of single linkers (Carroll and Fennema 
2002; Carroll, Fennema, and Heemskerk 2010; Heemskerk, Fennema, and Carroll 
2016). At the moment, a transnationalist class is very far from being realized on 
a global scale (Burris and Staples 2012). Instead, a more circumscribed version exists, 
in the form of a cohesive and consolidated Atlantic ruling class (a term coined by van 
der Pijl (1984)), which forms a bridge between resilient national and regional networks. 
Other parts of the world (including Japan and China) remain only marginally connected 
(Carroll 2009; Heemskerk and Takes 2016).
While quantitative studies largely agree on the spatial layout of the corporate elite 
network, there is a variety of views on how these interlocks should be interpreted and 
why they exist in the first place (Mizruchi 1996). The emergence of empirical research 
was mainly based on two complementary perspectives: the resource dependence model 
and the class hegemony model. The first theory sees corporate interlocks as 
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interorganizational phenomena, serving the interests of corporations. According to this 
interpretation, board interlocks are formed for instrumental purposes of control, coor-
dination, and/or allocation (Carroll 2007). They would help reduce economic uncer-
tainty and secure resources from banks and suppliers. Though most evidence suggests 
that directors are mainly recruited for reasons other than interorganizational strategies, 
for example, their experience or geographic proximity (Davis, Yoo, and Baker 2003), 
corporate interlocks clearly demonstrate a system of exchange that can have an effect 
on corporate governance. Dozens of studies have documented the influence of shared 
directorships on choices about corporate strategy and structure (see Davis, Yoo, and 
Baker 2003). It follows that interlocks can have implications for market control. As 
Buch-Hansen and Henriksen (2019, 25) describe, regardless of why a board interlock is 
formed, “it may simultaneously come to have implications related to market control if 
it happens to directly or indirectly connect competing companies.” The second theory, 
the class hegemony model, sees corporate interlocks as intraclass and interpersonal 
phenomena, serving the interests of the capitalist class. According to this theory, 
corporate interlocks are a means to maintain class cohesion, integrate new elites, and 
facilitate class-wide political action by constituting meeting points for directors 
(Carroll, Fennema, and Heemskerk 2010). The social interaction also functions to 
create or solidify shared identities and worldviews, common understandings, and 
mutual trust (Burris and Staples 2012). As such, corporate interlocks enable the 
corporate community to define and pursue its common interests in maintaining the 
status quo of concentrated corporate power (Sapinski and Carroll 2018).
In recent years, the global corporate elite network literature has expanded in scope 
and methodology. In response to the common criticism that corporate board interlocks 
through other companies constitute only one form of interlocking, some studies have 
focused on connections through policy planning institutes (Carroll and Carson 2003; 
Carroll and Sapinski 2010). These institutes were found to be important nodes for 
integrating corporate elites, constructing consensus within business communities, and 
enabling corporate capital to project influence in political domains. There have also 
been several regional or sectoral studies based on small samples of companies, 
particularly in the controversial oil and fossil fuel sector. For example, de Graaff 
(2012) examined the elite networks created through affiliations of the directors of the 
world’s largest oil companies with other corporations, policy planning bodies, and the 
state. She found that the increased cooperation between Western international oil 
companies and non-Western state-owned oil companies had not yet translated into 
increased integration of their elite networks. Other studies have moved beyond board 
interlocks and have examined other ways of corporate interlocking that serve informa-
tion flow, elite integration, and more explicit collaboration. de Graaff (2011) shows that 
her sample of five state-owned energy companies was substantively integrated with 
international oil companies through joint ventures, contracts, and other forms of 
agreements and collaborations, in contrast to the lack of integration of their elite 
networks. Finally, in a unique example of a social network analysis of the chemical 
industry, Buch-Hansen and Henriksen (2019) analyze the history of corporate board 
interlocks, cartels, and mergers and acquisitions in a sample of European chemical 
companies. The authors argue that these three phenomena represent means of (implicit) 
market control that became popular in specific time periods in response to changing 
political–economic conditions.
In our analysis, we focus on corporate interlocking through corporate boards and one 
type of interfirm alliance, namely, joint ventures. Joint ventures have been defined as 
legally and economically separate organizational entities created and governed by two 
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or more parent organizations that collectively invest financial, as well as other 
resources, to pursue certain objectives and share returns and risks (Anderson 1990). 
They usually have a limited scope of operations and a fixed life span. Companies 
typically pursue joint ventures for one or more of the following reasons (Kent 1991; 
Yan and Luo 2016): to gain access to new markets, to share risks for major investments 
or projects, to tap outside resources, to build competitive strength at significantly 
reduced costs, to gain scale efficiencies and greater market power by combining assets 
and operations, to manage rivalry in an industry by turning potential competitors into 
allies, and to meet host country requirements. We argue they can complement corporate 
board interlocks in functioning as a means of control and coordination between firms 
or as a communication channel contributing to elite integration.
Our study adds to the literature by analyzing corporate board interlocks and joint 
venture interlocks in a judgment sample of the petrochemical industry. However, to 
have a more nuanced view on integration, isolation, and power configurations in this 
industry, we want to account for relational proximity—interpreted as the degree to 
which individuals, firms, and communities are “bound by relations of common interest, 
purpose, or passion, and held together by routines and varying degrees of mutuality” 
(Murphy 2006, 430)—and spatial proximity, that is, co-location in geographic space. 
Therefore, we complement our exploration with an assessment of the spatial integration 
(or interlocking) of global petrochemical corporations.
World City Networks—Spatial Corporate Interlocking
While the idea of a transnational capitalist class has inspired network analysis of 
social interlocks between corporations in the global economy, the idea of global cities 
has fueled network analysis of city interlocks formed through corporations. Sassen 
(1991) points to advanced producer service firms as key agents for the servicing and 
controlling of the cross-border operations of global firms, which means the clustered 
network of advanced producer services could be considered a proxy for the manage-
ment and governance of global operations and be used to map the world city network. 
This theorization was followed by a quantitative or empirical turn, starting from the 
hierarchical office networks of global advanced producer service providers creating 
connectivity in the world city network (Taylor 2001). The resulting Interlocking World 
City Network Model (IWCNM) led to numerous contributions (Taylor 2004; 
Hennemann and Derudder 2014; Derudder and Taylor 2016). An important criticism 
of the IWCNM—similar to the criticism of board interlocks and echoing the structure 
versus agency debate in the relational economic geography—is that it solely detects the 
“channel system of flows and its relevant intersections” (Krätke 2014, 128), instead of 
addressing the question of what these producer service links exactly mean. This has led 
to calls for a refocus on the actual flows between producer service firms and multina-
tional corporations and qualitative studies on individual agency and practice (Parnreiter 
2014; Watson and Beaverstock 2014).
The IWCNM model is also criticized for its narrow focus on the role of cities as 
centers of specialist financial and corporate services (Krätke 2014). Some authors have 
expanded the scope by focusing on subsidiary networks of multinational firms from 
a broad range of economic subsectors (Alderson and Beckfield 2004; Wall, Burger, and 
Van der Knaap 2011; Wall and van der Knaap 2011). Only recently the analysis of 
networks of distinct industrial subsectors has taken off, based on the idea that urban 
positionality differs from one network to another. This idea explains the existence of 
multiple globalizations and globalizing cities—cities that are not truly global in all 
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economic sectors, but that are characterized by differing profiles of globally connected 
economic functions (Krätke 2014). The empirical research on multiple globalizations 
has pointed to particular sector-specific territorial configurations that are the result of 
path dependence, resource availability, market access, geopolitics, sectoral differentia-
tion and firm- and industry-based locational strategies (Sigler and Martinus 2016). 
Very diverse alternative geographies of globalization have been mapped, for example, 
for the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industry (Krätke 2014) and for the energy 
sector (Martinus and Tonts 2015).
Another recent development, building on the idea of multiple globalizations, is the 
attempt to integrate the world city network with global production networks in 
regionalizations of specific industries (Brown et al. 2010). The main idea is that 
specific gateway cities connect regional hinterlands to the global flows of the world 
city network through the initial (upstream) segments of global production networks 
(Breul and Diez 2018; Scholvin, Breul, and Diez 2019). Finally, THOFCs have also 
recently been identified as a specific kind of nodes in global firm networks. Sigler et al. 
(2020) showed that the role of place in decision-making has partly been reoriented 
from supply- or demand-side advantages to purely financial considerations, with global 
firm networks mimicking geographies of taxation.
The concepts of globalizing cities, gateway cities, and THOFCs can be applied to 
construct the alternative geography of the petrochemical industry’s spatial organization. 
However, we want to take the methodology one step further, inspired by Yang and 
Dong’s analysis of the spatial strategies of individual oil companies based on head-
quarter subsidiary data (2016). Instead of constructing a network of intercity links, 
based on headquarter-subsidiary ties within a large sample of multinational corpora-
tions, we construct a network of interfirm links based on spatial interlocks (i.e., co- 
location of subsidiaries) in a small sample of multinational corporations. This approach 
leads to a spatial proximity perspective on interorganizational collaboration and 
competition.
Toward Integration—Relational Economic Geography
The corporate elite network literature shows how companies are connected through 
social spaces of interaction, while the world city network literature shows how they are 
connected through physical spaces of interaction. We see both literatures as comple-
mentary in revealing different sets of relations between firms and argue that some 
concepts from the relational economic geography literature are particularly useful to 
integrate and interpret our research findings. First, the combined analysis of different 
social and spatial corporate interlocks is supported by the interpretation of proximity as 
a multidimensional concept that involves both relational and spatial proximity 
(Rodríguez-Pose 2010). While relational proximity, involving translocal relationships, 
has grown in importance with increasing globalization, spatial or geographic proximity 
still plays a role in many industries. This is not only because of classical location 
conditions but also because of reduced transaction costs and enhanced capabilities for 
knowledge transfer and organizational and technological learning (so-called untraded 
interdependencies) (Bathelt and Glückler 2003; Murphy 2018). Second, the structure 
versus agency debate, central to the relational economic geography literature, motivates 
our methodological approach to networks. Some relational economic geography scho-
lars have criticized research that focuses on network structure and actor positionality 
instead of intentional human agency (Grabher 2006; Glückler 2007; Sunley 2008). 
Although we appreciate this criticism, we contend that network analysis still provides 
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a useful analytical perspective to understand the relational infrastructure through which 
agency can be exercised by individual agents and which as a whole also constitutes 
structural power relations (Dicken et al. 2001).
We interpret our multiscalar corporate network analysis as a snapshot in time, 
simultaneously reflecting past events, present interdependencies, and possible future 
pathways. In our analysis, we draw on three concepts from relational economic 
geography for interpreting economic action and interaction, following Bathelt and 
Glückler (2003): (1) contextuality, (2) path dependence, and (3) contingency. These 
relational concepts have been empirically applied in a variety of contexts, from 
industrial cluster evolution (Li, Bathelt, and Wang 2011), over foreign direct invest-
ment in peripheral regions (Dawley 2007), to peri-urban farmer adaptation (Clark and 
Munroe 2014). By using these concepts to interpret three different interpretations of 
corporate networks, we aim to be more nuanced than other studies of world cities and 
corporate elite networks. At the same time, we emphasize the importance of network 
analysis for advancing innovative perspectives within relational economic geography, 
which seek to engage with both structure and agency to understand power configura-
tions and inequalities in the global economy.
Methodology
We have analyzed corporate board interlocks, joint venture interlocks, and spatial 
interlocks in a sample of global petrochemical corporations. The analysis was 
restricted4 to the top ten chemical corporations in 2016 and—because the top ten 
was still dominated by established companies—four additional top fifty corporations 
from emerging economies (Table 1). These fourteen companies provided a diverse 
sample with several corporations based in the traditional petrochemical powers of 
Western Europe and the US, some Asian entrants from the second half of the twentieth 
century (based in Japan, Saudi Arabia, and Taiwan), and corporations from different 
emerging economies (notably China).
For the corporate board interlocks, data on the composition of the boards of directors and 
directors’ affiliations were extracted from Orbis (Bureau van Dijk), a database with 
information on companies worldwide. Affiliations did not only include membership of 
other boards of directors but also membership of advisory boards, scientific boards, and 
boards of trustees, or purely operational positions. Additionally, the annual reports and 
corporate websites of the fourteen companies were consulted to cross-check and complete 
the data, together with online open access corporate databases such as Bloomberg and 
Hoovers. Finally, the websites and annual reports of affiliated companies and organizations 
were used to confirm the actual affiliations of the fourteen corporate boards. Data collec-
tion took place between April and June 2018 and thus reflects the composition of the 
boards and their affiliations at that time.
For the joint venture interlocks, data were collected in the first place from the annual 
reports and corporate websites of the fourteen corporations. Also, joint operations were 
included, an often-used strategy in the oil and gas sector in which two companies come 
together and start an operation jointly, without creating a separate business entity. Data 
were cross-checked and completed using online open access corporate databases 
(Bloomberg, Hoovers). A final verification process included a Google search of 
every combination of two companies together with the keyword joint venture. This 
4 For reasons of data accessibility and limited resources, we had to confine our sample to fourteen 
corporations.
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way, most joint ventures between the fourteen corporations should have been discov-
ered, as well as important joint ventures with other companies. Data were collected 
over the course of June and July 2018 and reflect the situation at that moment.
For the spatial interlocks, the subsidiary networks of the fourteen corporations were 
exported from Orbis. For each corporation, this network contained all majority-owned 
subsidiaries. Since the spatial interlocks analysis focuses on geographic proximity, an 
important preparatory step was the cleaning and coding of the location data. Subsidiary 
locations registered in Orbis were considered to be correct, and other corporate 
databases or Google were only used to find the location of subsidiaries with missing 
information. Finally, locations were aggregated to the larger metropolitan area that they 
are part of, if applicable.5 These standardized agglomeration data were used in further 
analysis. Primary data were extracted from Orbis in December 2017 and reflect the 
situation at that moment.
Social and spatial interlocks were analyzed using the network analysis software 
UCINET (Borgatti, Everett, and Johnson 2018). Based on the corporate board inter-
locks, the joint venture interlocks, and the spatial interlocks, we have created three one- 
mode company by company networks with valued ties based on the strength of the 
interlocks. The corporate board interlock network was transformed from the two-mode 
affiliation–director network. All identified interlocks were indirect interlocks, whereby 
directors of two corporations meet each other in a third board. We present two 
diagrams. One is based on indirect interlocks through another company, mainly 
through shared directorship in the board of directors. A second diagram presents 
indirect connections through the board of directors or board of trustees of policy- 
planning institutes, trade associations, charities, think tanks, schools, and universities 
as well as through state affiliations. The joint venture interlock network was trans-
formed from the two-mode company–joint venture network. We present two diagrams: 
one based on direct interlocks (a joint venture between two companies of our sample), 
Table 1  
Sampled Companies, with Data Extracted from the List of Top Fifty Chemical Companies in 2016 
according to Chemical & Engineering News (https://cen.acs.org/sections/global-top-50.html)
2016 Ranking Change from 2007 Company Headquarters Location
Chemical Sales 
($ Million)
1 +1 DowDuPont US $67,837
2 −1 BASF Germany $60,654
3 +3 Sinopec China $42,815
4 +3 SABIC Saudi Arabia $30,986
5 +5 Formosa Plastics Taiwan $27,141
6 −1 ExxonMobil US $26,058
7 +6 LyondellBasell Netherlands $24,624
8 −4 INEOS Switzerland $23,530
9 +3 Mitsubishi Chemical Japan $23,358
10 +8 Air Liquide France $19,554
… … … … …
17 +4 Reliance Industries India $13,769
18 +18 Braskem Brazil $13,692
42 −1 Sasol South Africa $7,148
48 NA PTT Global Chemical Thailand $6,151
Note: For the merged companies DowDuPont and LyondellBasell the highest ranked partner in 2006 was used for the 
calculation. 
5 This is a common approach in World City Network analysis, where boundaries of world cities are not 
defined by administrative or political criteria, but rather by patterns of interaction.
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another based on indirect interlocks (joint ventures with the same external company). 
The spatial interlock network was transformed from the two-mode company-city 
network. The extent of the co-location of subsidiaries of two companies was calculated 
as a measure of their spatial integration. We present two diagrams: one based on the 
absolute values (the number of locations in common), another based on relative values 
(the absolute number divided by the maximum number of possible meeting points of 
the two companies).
To visualize the six resulting networks, we have applied metric multidimensional 
scaling (MDS) based on the tie strength as a proximity matrix. This means the 
optimum two-dimensional representation of the network is sought in which companies 
with stronger ties will be located closer to each other, while weaker ties will push 
companies away from each other. Together with adapting tie width according to the 
strength of the interlocks, this scaling provides an additional aid in making sense of the 
network visualization. Finally, the spatial interlock network is complemented with 
a map of the points of integration—or meeting points—between the subsidiary net-
works of the six companies headquartered in the traditional petrochemical powers of 
Europe and the US, and the eight companies from other parts of the world.
Results: Interlocking Networks in the Petrochemical 
Industry
Figure 1 (left side) shows the network of indirect corporate board interlocks through 
other companies in 2018. The network consisted of one component of six intercon-
nected companies, and eight individual companies that were not connected to any other 
company. It is striking that in our small sample, apart from INEOS,6 all companies 
based in Europe and the US were interconnected. These are all companies whose roots 
go back to the early days of the petrochemical industry. Brazilian Braskem was the 
only company from outside the North Atlantic petrochemical heartland that participat-
ed in this interconnected component. However, the Braskem link to ExxonMobil was 
not a particularly strong one, with Braskem director Gesner Oliveira as a member of 
Uber Technologies’ policy advisory board and ExxonMobil director Ursula Burns as 
chairman of Uber Technologies’ board of directors. The five other members of the 
component were interconnected through seven corporate interlocks, of which the 
French-German Air Liquide-BASF connection stood out as particularly strong with 
three interlocks (which is why they are positioned close to each other in the diagram). 
Of these seven corporate interlocks, five consisted of shared directorships of another 
company’s board (BP, JPMorgan Chase, Siemens, Cicap, and TechnipFMC), one 
consisted of two similar senior advisory positions in the same company (EW 
Healthcare Partners), and one consisted of a board membership and a CEO position 
(Daimler).
The right side of the diagram in Figure 1 shows interlocks based on affiliations with 
policy-planning institutes, trade associations, charities, think tanks, schools, universi-
ties, and states. It is the same group of companies (this time without Braskem) that was 
strongly interconnected in one component, while all other companies were not con-
nected to any other company of our sample. Within the interconnected component, 
three US-based policy-planning organizations played a crucial role: the Business 
Council, the National Petroleum Council, and the Business Roundtable. They linked 
three corporations that are based in the US (ExxonMobil and DowDuPont) or have 
6 INEOS is privately owned and has no board of directors.
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partly American roots (LyondellBasell). The other ten interlocking organizations were 
only linked to two companies. There also existed a large difference in the number of 
interlocking connections each company had. With several directors active in interlock-
ing, DowDuPont had fifteen single connections to interlocking third parties, while 
BASF had only two. Finally, the thirty-six interlocking ties were made by only fourteen 
directors, with eight of them responsible for multiple ties. The biggest linkers were 
DowDuPont’s CEO Andrew Liveris7 with six interlocking connections, and 
LyondellBasell’s CEO Bhavesh Patel with five.
In summary, integration and isolation in the network structure composed by inter-
locking directorships can be interpreted through the concepts of contextuality, path 
dependence, and contingency (Table 2). We have found a highly integrated North 
Atlantic component, with very few ties to the rest of the world. On one level, this 
supports the findings of transnational capitalist class studies (Carroll 2009; Heemskerk, 
Fennema, and Carroll 2016), but it can also be interpreted through the lens of path 
dependence within the petrochemical industry, with the current corporate networks 
forming the legacy of decades of Western leadership of the industry. The lack of 
integration between Western and non-Western elites, also found for the oil industry 
(de Graaff 2012; de Graaff and van Apeldoorn 2017), tells us something about existing 
social power structures and opportunities for exercising individual agency, but it 
provides a very partial view. Not only are there many other ways through which elites 
can connect, but the lack of integration should also be interpreted contextually. For 
example, the leading petrochemical players in China and Brazil—vertically integrated 
and tied to (majority) state-owned oil companies—have long been driven by regional 
ambitions of market self-sufficiency and are only recently aspiring more global ambi-
tions, which might be reflected in their board composition (Carlos Zalaf Caseiro and 
Masiero 2014). Finally, the discovery of links that deviate from traditional patterns, 
such as the one between Braskem and ExxonMobil, shows that petrochemical 
Figure 1. Corporate board interlock network based on indirect interlocks through other 
companies (left) and through policy-planning institutes, other organizations, and states (right).
Note: White squares: companies based in Europe and the US; dark grey squares: post–World 
War II Asian entrants; light grey squares: companies from emerging economies. Tie width 
represents the number of interlocks, and metric multidimensional scaling was applied. 
7 Data were collected in April 2018, just before Andrew Liveris officially stepped down as director and 
CEO.
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corporate board networks are contingent, building on existing structures but moving in 
new directions.
The findings of our corporate board network analysis are further nuanced by our 
joint venture network analysis. The left diagram in Figure 2 shows that in 2018 only 
three corporations (Reliance Industries, Braskem, and Formosa) did not have any 
verifiable joint venture with another company of our sample. All other companies 
formed one integrated component, with Chinese state-owned Sinopec clearly taking the 
most central position, linking to seven other companies of our sample through twelve 
joint ventures (all located in China). The Thai state-owned company PTT Global 
Chemical had a similar profile, connecting to three Thailand-based joint ventures 
with more established petrochemical companies. Overall, we could not find any joint 
ventures between the five companies from emerging economies (light grey squares), 
and apart from a strong tie between BASF and DowDuPont composed of six joint 
ventures,8 it was not a popular way of integrating Western companies either.
Within our small sample, joint ventures are a clear means of integration between 
Western companies and companies from emerging economies (thirteen of twenty-seven 
identified joint ventures). A possible incentive for Western multinationals is to gain 
access to new markets and resources through these joint ventures, while emerging 
economy partners might be looking to acquire technology and know-how. This tech-
nology transfer idea lies at the basis of China’s policy of attracting direct foreign 
investment with cheap labor and tax incentives, with a preference for joint ventures 
(Yan and Luo 2016). However, other strategic aims like sharing risk for major invest-
ments and gaining scale efficiencies may play an equally important role. Although it 
goes beyond the scope of this article to discuss the details of individual joint ventures, 
the concentration of joint venture relationships on some emerging economy corpora-
tions warrants further investigation.
The right diagram in Figure 2 shows the corporate interlock network based on joint 
ventures with third companies. This network shows one strongly integrated component, of 
Figure 2. Joint venture interlock network based on direct joint venture integration (left) and 
through joint ventures with the same external companies (right).
Note: White squares: companies based in Europe and the US; dark grey squares: post–World 
War II Asian entrants; light grey squares: companies from emerging economies. Tie width 
represents the number of interlocks, and metric multidimensional scaling was applied. 
8 Five of these relate to the same DowDuPont-BASF plant in Antwerp.
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which only Braskem and LyondellBasell are excluded. Given that LyondellBasell is part of 
the direct joint venture network, Braskem is the only company that remains isolated. The 
metric multidimensional scaling applied to the network shows that ExxonMobil and 
Sinopec shared the most joint venture partners (seven) followed by ExxonMobil-BASF 
(five), ExxonMobil-Sasol (four) and BASF-Sinopec (four). A substantial overlap in the 
choice of joint venture partners thus connected companies from emerging economies with 
Western companies, as such forming an integrated global industry. Some joint venture 
partners were very prominent: Chevron had joint venture relations with six different 
companies of our sample; BP and Total had joint venture relations with five companies; 
and Shell, PetroChina, and Asahi Kasei had joint venture relations with four companies. 
Apart from Asahi Kasei, these are all major oil and gas companies, pointing to the close ties 
between the petrochemical industry and the oil and gas industry.
In summary, while the corporate board interlock analysis showed little integration 
between Western and non-Western corporate elites, our joint venture analysis revealed 
that most non-Western corporations were part of an integrated company system 
through either direct or indirect joint venture relations. The network demonstrates 
a higher degree of contingency and a lower degree of path dependence, as compared 
to the corporate board interlock network (Table 2). The fixed life span and limited 
scope of operations of joint ventures does not require the same level of personal trust; 
instead, strategic business aims seem to prevail, and new joint venture relationships can 
be established quickly. These findings are in line with de Graaff’s (2011) finding on the 
substantial integration of non-Western state-owned energy companies with internation-
al oil companies through joint ventures and other contracts and collaborations, in 
contrast to the lack of integration of their elite networks. Despite the fixed life span 
of joint ventures, path dependence still plays a role. For example, BASF has operated 
in China for more than 130 years,9 and it is therefore no surprise it is involved in joint 
ventures with Sinopec. Finally, also in the interpretation of the joint venture network, 
one should be aware of the context of the different corporations. For example, the close 
relation10 of Brazilian Braskem with state-controlled oil producer Petrobras means 
there is less incentive to set up joint ventures with other oil companies.
The two diagrams in Figure 3 do not show social ties between corporations, but 
rather spatial ties on the basis of shared locations in global subsidiary networks in 
2017. The left side of the diagram is based on the absolute number of meeting points or 
co-locations, while the right side of the diagram is based on a relative score in which 
the lowest number of unique locations of the two subsidiary networks is the denomi-
nator. What immediately stands out is that every corporation was connected to every 
other corporation through at least one shared location. The most important shared 
location is Houston, the only place that is part of all fourteen subsidiary networks. This 
self-proclaimed energy capital of the world (Blevins 2014) seems to be equally 
important as the petrochemical capital of the world, connecting the company networks 
of Western and non-Western companies.
In Figure 3 (left side) we notice that North American and European corporations are 
at the center of the network, relatively close to each other, which means they shared 
a substantial number of locations. The strongest tie is between BASF and DowDuPont 
(122 shared locations), followed by DowDuPont-Air Liquide (109 locations) and 
9 See https:basf.com/global/en/who-we-are/history/130-years-of-basf-in-china.html for details on BASF’s 
Chinese operations.
10 Petrobras owns 36.1 percent of Braskem’s outstanding shares and 47.0 percent of its voting shares 
(http://braskem.com.br/RI/ownership-structure).
15
G
LO
B
A
L PET
R
O
C
H
EM
IC
A
L C
O
R
PO
R
A
T
E N
ET
W
O
R
K
S
Vol. 00 No. 00 2020
T
ab
le
 2
  
Su
m
m
ar
y 
of
 R
es
ul
ts
 o
f 
th
e 
M
ul
tis
ca
la
r 
Co
rp
or
at
e 
N
et
w
or
k 
An
al
ys
is 
th
ro
ug
h 
th
e 
Co
nc
ep
ts
 o
f 
Co
nt
ex
tu
al
ity
, P
at
h 
D
ep
en
de
nc
e,
 a
nd
 C
on
tin
ge
nc
y
C
on
te
xt
ua
lit
y
Pa
th
 D
ep
en
de
nc
e
C
on
tin
ge
nc
y
C
or
po
ra
te
 b
oa
rd
 n
et
w
or
ks
C
om
pa
ni
es
 h
av
e 
di
ffe
re
nt
 o
w
ne
rs
hi
p 
st
ru
ct
ur
es
,  
an
d 
va
ry
in
g 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l a
m
bi
tio
ns
 m
ay
  
le
ad
 t
o 
m
or
e 
in
w
ar
d-
or
 o
ut
w
ar
d-
lo
ok
in
g 
 
co
rp
or
at
e 
bo
ar
ds
.
R
es
ili
en
t 
W
es
te
rn
 e
lit
e 
ne
tw
or
ks
  
re
m
ai
n 
ce
nt
er
ed
 o
n 
th
e 
N
or
th
 A
tla
nt
ic
  
pe
tr
oc
he
m
ic
al
 h
ea
rt
la
nd
, w
hi
le
 e
m
er
gi
ng
  
ec
on
om
y 
el
ite
s 
re
m
ai
n 
is
ol
at
ed
.
So
m
e 
co
rp
or
at
e 
lin
ks
 d
ev
ia
te
 fr
om
 t
he
  
ge
ne
ra
l p
at
te
rn
 o
f i
so
la
tio
n 
of
 e
m
er
gi
ng
  
ec
on
om
y 
el
ite
 n
et
w
or
ks
 (
e.
g.
,  
Br
as
ke
m
-E
xx
on
M
ob
il)
.
Jo
in
t 
ve
nt
ur
e 
ne
tw
or
ks
D
iff
er
en
t 
co
m
pa
ny
 s
tr
at
eg
ie
s 
(e
.g
., 
ve
rt
ic
al
  
in
te
gr
at
io
n 
ve
rs
us
 s
pe
ci
al
iz
at
io
n)
  
an
d 
cl
os
e 
tie
s 
w
ith
 (
st
at
e-
co
nt
ro
lle
d)
  
oi
l c
om
pa
ni
es
 in
flu
en
ce
 d
iff
er
en
t 
 
jo
in
t 
ve
nt
ur
e 
ne
tw
or
ks
.
Sp
ec
ifi
c 
bu
si
ne
ss
 h
is
to
ri
es
 (
e.
g.
, B
A
SF
 in
 C
hi
na
) 
an
d 
 
ge
op
ol
iti
ca
l r
el
at
io
ns
hi
ps
 (
e.
g.
, b
et
w
ee
n 
th
e 
U
S 
an
d 
 
Sa
ud
i A
ra
bi
a)
 f
or
m
 fo
un
da
tio
ns
 f
or
  
jo
in
t 
ve
nt
ur
e 
cr
ea
tio
n.
Fi
xe
d 
lif
e 
sp
an
 a
nd
 li
m
ite
d 
sc
op
e 
of
  
op
er
at
io
ns
 o
f 
jo
in
t 
ve
nt
ur
es
 a
llo
w
s 
fo
r 
 
st
ra
te
gi
c 
co
lla
bo
ra
tio
ns
 b
et
w
ee
n 
 
W
es
te
rn
 a
nd
 e
m
er
gi
ng
  
ec
on
om
y 
co
rp
or
at
io
ns
, t
o 
ad
ap
t 
to
  
ec
on
om
ic
 c
ha
ng
e 
an
d 
un
ce
rt
ai
nt
y.
Sp
at
ia
l i
nt
er
lo
ck
 n
et
w
or
ks
D
iff
er
en
t 
co
rp
or
at
e 
am
bi
tio
ns
  
(e
.g
., 
re
gi
on
al
 v
er
su
s 
gl
ob
al
 le
ad
er
sh
ip
) 
 
le
ad
 t
o 
di
ffe
re
nt
 g
eo
gr
ap
hi
c 
ne
tw
or
ks
  
an
d 
lo
ca
tio
ns
 o
f a
ct
iv
iti
es
. 
Im
po
rt
an
ce
 o
f 
ga
te
w
ay
 c
iti
es
 a
nd
  
T
H
O
FC
S 
in
 r
eo
ri
en
tin
g 
su
bs
id
ia
ry
 n
et
w
or
ks
.
Su
bs
id
ia
ry
 n
et
w
or
ks
 o
f 
W
es
te
rn
 c
om
pa
ni
es
  
fo
rm
 t
he
 b
ac
kb
on
e 
of
 t
he
 g
lo
ba
l s
pa
tia
l  
or
ga
ni
za
tio
n 
of
 t
he
 in
du
st
ry
 t
o 
w
hi
ch
 a
ll 
 
ne
w
 c
or
po
ra
tio
ns
 c
on
ne
ct
 t
o 
so
m
e 
ex
te
nt
. 
C
on
tin
ui
ng
 im
po
rt
an
ce
 o
f 
es
ta
bl
is
he
d 
 
W
es
te
rn
 p
et
ro
ch
em
ic
al
 p
ow
er
 c
en
te
rs
.
So
m
e 
A
si
an
 a
nd
 e
m
er
gi
ng
 e
co
no
m
y 
 
co
rp
or
at
io
ns
 d
ev
el
op
 d
et
ac
he
d 
re
gi
on
al
  
su
bs
id
ia
ry
 n
et
w
or
ks
 a
nd
 t
ak
e 
a 
 
pe
ri
ph
er
al
 p
os
iti
on
 in
 t
he
 g
lo
ba
l  
sp
at
ia
l o
rg
an
iz
at
io
n 
(e
.g
., 
Si
no
pe
c)
. 
Em
er
ge
nc
e 
of
 n
ew
 s
tr
at
eg
ic
  
po
w
er
 c
en
te
rs
 in
 A
si
a 
an
d 
So
ut
h 
A
m
er
ic
a.
16
ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY
BASF-Air Liquide (104 locations). This triad is surrounded by the three other Western 
corporations, the three Asian post–World War II entrants, and the five emerging 
economies corporations positioned the furthest from the center. This observation 
could easily lead to the conclusion that non-Western corporations, and particularly 
those from emerging economies, are rather weakly integrated in the global petrochem-
ical network. However, this network is based on the absolute number of interlocks and 
is severely distorted by the variation in the number of subsidiaries, and hence in the 
number of unique locations, in the different corporate networks. The spatially most 
diverse network, DowDuPont, had a link to 421 locations, while PTT Global Chemical 
was only present in 10 locations. On average, the European and North American 
corporations had far more locations in their network (247) than the Asian post–World 
War II entrants (109) and the emerging economies corporations (35).
The diagram based on relative strength of spatial interlocks (Figure 3, right side) 
provides a different view. Again, it shows that Air Liquide, BASF, and DowDuPont are 
central to the network. However, PTT Global Chemical and Braskem also have 
a central position. This means that a lot of the (relatively few) locations in their 
company networks were shared with other corporate networks. For example, of the 
ten locations in PTT Global Chemical’s corporate network, seven were also part of Air 
Liquide’s and BASF’s networks. On the other side of the spectrum, Sinopec and 
Formosa Plastics remain very poorly integrated and peripheral in the network diagram. 
For example, of the seventy-one locations in Sinopec’s network, on average only 
18 percent were shared with other corporations. This illustrates China’s aim of self- 
sufficiency going together with a focus on consolidating a national (or regional) 
corporate network (Tobin 2019).
We can conclude there is substantial integration between subsidiary networks with 
very different sociospatial histories. This global constellation demonstrates a high 
degree of path dependence, with the subsidiary networks of Western companies still 
forming the backbone to which the networks of post–World War II Asian entrants and 
emerging economies corporations connect (illustrated by the central positioning of 
BASF, Air Liquide, DowDuPont, and LyondellBasell in the right diagram). At the 
same time, the peripheral position of some corporations in the spatial interlock network 
Figure 3. Spatial interlock network based on absolute number of overlapping locations (left 
side) and relative number (right side).
Note: White squares: companies based in Europe and the US; dark grey squares: post–World 
War II Asian entrants; light grey squares: companies from emerging economies. Tie width 
represents the degree of spatial interlocking, and metric multidimensional scaling was applied. 
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means they are following different spatial logics, confirming the contingent character 
of subsidiary networks. Finally, different corporate ambitions, for example, regional or 
global leadership, require us to take context into account when interpreting this 
network from the perspective of power structures (Table 2).
While it is clear from both diagrams that subsidiary networks connect to each other, 
it is not clear where they connect. We define meeting points as the locations where 
corporations headquartered in the traditional North Atlantic core were present together 
with corporations from other parts of the world. These meeting points could be 
strategic places in the next stage of the petrochemical era, given the growth of non- 
Western corporations, though unpredictable events—such as COVID-19 and the crude 
oil crash in 2020—can always steer the global spatial organization of the industry in 
new directions. In Figure 4 we have mapped these meeting points, and we have 
highlighted the most important ones. The grey nodes represent all meeting points, 
places where at least one Western and one non-Western corporation is present. These 
nodes are concentrated in the eastern part of the US, Western Europe, and along the 
Asian Pacific coast. Apart from these three areas we find meeting points scattered 
across the globe, though with a clearly lower presence in South America, Africa, and 
Australia. Our map shows that the spatial organizational hierarchy of the petrochemical 
industry is quite resilient, with cities in the US and northwestern Europe still forming 
the backbone. However, we also identified new meeting points or strategic hubs, 
particularly in Asia, pointing to a slow geographic shift of strategic power, following 
the geographic shift of production and the growth of non-Western companies. It also 
confirms the idea of a multipolar world order and the end of the American hegemony 
(Amin 2013).
The star-shaped nodes in Figure 4 represent top meeting points, places where at least 
half of the Western companies (three out of six) and half of the non-Western companies 
(four out of eight) of our sample were present. There were exactly ten of these 
locations, half of them located in the old petrochemical heartland of Western Europe 
and the US, and half of them located in other parts of the world (mainly Asia). This 
Figure 4. Location of meeting points where the subsidiary networks of American and European 
corporations integrate with those of Asian and emerging economies corporations.
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again supports the view of a relatively resilient structure of traditional Western 
petrochemical power centers, combined with a significant move to new strategic 
centers elsewhere. Of the ten top meeting points, nine are so-called Alpha global cities, 
the primary nodes in the global economic network as defined by the Globalization and 
World Cities Research Network (GaWC) in 2018 (https://www.lboro.ac.uk/gawc/ 
world2018t.html). Philadelphia is the only beta city, meaning it is of lower global 
importance. Its significance mainly depends on having the city of Wilmington 
(Delaware) in its urban agglomeration, home to the headquarters of DuPont and 
a typical place where companies register an office due to its desirable corporate 
taxes and law, permitting operations across the whole US. Despite this large overlap, 
some important global cities are clearly missing, such as Paris, Tokyo, and Dubai, 
while lower-ranked global cities, such as Amsterdam and Houston, take a prominent 
place. These two cities in particular can be understood through the perspective of 
globalizing cities, cities whose urban positionality differs from one network to another 
(Krätke 2014). They are key points in the organizational hierarchy of the petrochemical 
industry, which is partly detached from the assumed structure of global cities. This 
organizational hierarchy is less driven by command and control motivations, but rather 
is the result of historic path dependence, contextuality (e.g., resource availability and 
market access), and contingency (e.g., geopolitics and firm-based locational strategies) 
(Sigler and Martinus 2016). Some of these cities also take up a role as gateway cities or 
focal points in regionalizations of the petrochemical industry (Brown et al. 2010). 
Singapore, for example, has been shown to be a gateway city in upstream oil and gas 
global production networks, and has a long history as a refinery and transport and 
logistics hub for the petrochemical industry (Breul and Diez 2018). Finally, in the 
territorial configuration of the global petrochemical industry, we identify the reorienta-
tion from supply- or demand-side advantages to purely financial considerations, lead-
ing to global firm networks mimicking geographies of taxation (Sigler et al. 2020). No 
less than five out of ten top meeting points are often listed as THOFCs: Hong Kong, 
Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, Amsterdam, and Wilmington (Philadelphia). Other notori-
ous places, like Bermuda and the British Virgin Islands, can be easily spotted on the 
petrochemical map. This represents a network development that is contextual, follow-
ing the geographies of taxation, yet contingent on unpredictable events such as changes 
in regulation.
Discussion
In this article we have brought together literatures on corporate elite networks and 
world city networks, and combined their methodologies in an innovative, relational 
analysis of the global petrochemical industry. We have worked with a judgment sample 
of companies with the aim of gaining insights into the social and spatial organization of 
this complex industry. We have found a combination of integration and isolation in the 
industry’s corporate board, joint venture, and spatial interlock networks. In combina-
tion with longitudinal industry data, business histories of the petrochemical industry 
(Chandler 2009), and recent debates about the shift toward a multipolar global world 
with competing corporate elites and places (Amin 2013; Heemskerk and Takes 2016), 
we have interpreted our findings as a combination of resilience and change, or path 
dependence and contingency, in patterns of power and collaboration.
In line with transnational capitalist class studies and the idea of an Atlantic ruling 
class (van der Pijl 1984), we have found a very resilient and integrated North Atlantic 
elite network, with all Asian and emerging economy companies being isolated. 
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However, we argue for a nuanced interpretation of these findings, for path dependence 
and differences in corporations’ global ambitions are also important explanatory 
factors. The global joint venture network was much more integrated, with emerging 
economy corporations being important partners for European and North American 
companies, and with a significant similarity in external joint venture partners leading 
to an integrated global company system that includes almost every company in our 
sample. Finally, the global spatial interlock network was relatively integrated, with 
subsidiary networks overlapping to a significant degree, pointing to the relevance of 
spatial proximity and agglomeration effects in this industry. The global spatial interlock 
network demonstrates a high degree of path dependence, with the networks of Western 
companies forming a resilient backbone, though some corporations that do not fit in the 
multinational logic have more detached regional networks. Geographically, the petro-
chemical power hubs in Europe and the US have retained their power but have been 
joined by emerging strategic centers predominantly along the Asian Pacific coast, 
confirming the shift toward a multipolar global order.
Our study has some limitations. First, the small judgment sample of fourteen global 
petrochemical companies and the cross-sectional character of our data analysis 
requires us to be cautious in our statements about the petrochemical industry, let 
alone the global economy (e.g., the existence of a transnational capitalist class). 
However, the fourteen corporations were carefully selected based on being part of 
the top ten global companies or on being located in emerging economies, to get an idea 
of what the further growth of emerging economy corporations might mean for the 
industry’s social and spatial organization. Second, data were collected from verified 
databases, manually checked and expanded, but still contain some flaws. For example, 
the quality of Orbis data is variable, and information on directors’ affiliations and joint 
ventures is more accessible and reliable for European and American corporations. 
Third, only specific forms of corporate interlocks were explored: corporate board 
interlocks, joint venture interlocks, and spatial interlocks. Other ways of corporate 
interlocking (such as contracts—see de Graaff 2011) were not examined. Fourth, the 
spatial corporate interlock analysis includes all subsidiaries and does not take into 
account where most value is added or which places are most important for a specific 
company. We would need more in-depth qualitative research and more comprehensive 
subsidiary data to go beyond a rough estimate of the spatial range of a company’s 
activities and make firmer conclusions about the strategic power of particular cities. 
Finally, an important limitation of our analytical framework is the focus on the 
network structure, only revealing the social and spatial conduits of economic agency 
or power (Grabher 2006; Glückler 2007; Sunley 2008). While we argue that our 
analytical framework advances an understanding of structural power relations, we 
admit it falls short of conceptualizing or analyzing how power and agency are 
effectuated through these networks.
Our present analysis has captured a snapshot in time of rapidly changing networks 
but nonetheless reveals the legacies of continuity—the established power networks of 
dominant Western firms—together with the seeds for transformative change—the 
extent of emerging network structures moving in new directions. While corporate 
elite networks in emerging economies remain isolated from the established elite core, 
corporations in emerging economies have integrated with Western companies through 
joint ventures and spatial interlocks in petrochemical hub cities. This finding is in line 
with de Graaff’s (2011) conclusions on recent evolutions in the oil industry. She noted 
a dual development of state-controlled oil companies’ remarkable expansion and 
simultaneous integration. The implication is that while traditional Western 
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multinationals might have lost power in terms of market share, and emerging economy 
corporations like Sinopec or PTT Global Chemical might have gained power, they have 
also become increasingly interdependent. As de Graaff (2011, 279) argues, “the 
growing transnational dimension might be the most important and fundamental aspect 
of the recent period,” with the distribution of power becoming “increasingly diffused.” 
On the one hand, our analysis of changing global petrochemical elite networks points 
to a new balance of power between well-established Western multinationals and 
rapidly growing challengers from emerging economies. On the other hand, our analysis 
of integration in a diversified playing field underscores the importance of interdepen-
dence in a global economy. The shift to a multipolar—but also more interdependent— 
global economy may be even more acute in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic, 
with intensifying geopolitical rifts between the US and China, and international 
pressure to address climate change. Through applying a multiscalar corporate network 
analysis to investigate the complex dynamics of isolation and integration in the 
petrochemical industry, we hope that our study inspires further in-depth mapping of 
similar shifting power balances in the global economy.
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